Global Intifada

Here’s a rough draft of something I’ve been working on. Its incomplete and I have to go back and insert further evidence and proper citation and what not.

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Introduction: Three Weak Theories of American State Action

There are three conventional methodologies of attempting to understand how America behaves as a state: (1) to examine and take for granted the declarations of those in power (i.e. American leaders say what they mean and they mean what they say), (2) to assume that America’s purported ideological foundations as a democracy are what guide its domestic and foreign policy, and (3) to assume that America’s economic system (neoclassical liberalism albeit a mixed one) propagates the state to act in a particular manner. Often, clever sound bytes are used to express either identical or variants of these three methodologies such as by arguing that America seeks to promote/oppose several dyads (freedom/tyranny, security/terrorism, progress/stagnation, etc) or that American dominance is accidental, or that it is a reluctant superpower and so on and so forth.

Heads of State Determine American Behavior. The first approach is improper because there have many instances where the formal and informal declarations of American political actors have been completely contradictory with how the government or state subsequently behaved. After all, in this election campaign season alone, both candidates have flip-flopped on a variety of promises that they had made earlier. It isn’t all that difficult to trace how the declarations of heads of state are often not the motivations in American state behavior especially given that presidents are only but one cog in a complex political machine. Moreover, one could make a reasonable argument that virtually every single president in American history has contradicted the very policies which he preached previously. From the early days of the Republic, a clear pattern of behavior emerges that supersedes the proclamations of the heads of state in determining the national interest. Several quick examples suffice:

(1) Proclamations of freedom are embedded in the Constitution, but were denied to African slaves,

(2) a variety of treaties were made with Native Americans, yet almost immediately violated or were later on violated by future administrations,

(3) McKinley opposed Spanish colonialism, but once having won the war against it, took up its possessions throughout the world,

(4) Wilson argued in favor of recognizing the national sovereignty of all nations, but weeks before had authorized US troops to invade and subjugate various Caribbean nations that didn’t conform to certain corporate interests,

(5) Interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan under the Soviet Union, and Iraq are probably the prime examples of how fictitious or weak justifications by heads of state were invoked to justify American intervention.

Democracy Determines American Behaviour: The second method of analysis in determining what motivates the American state is also insufficient. Firstly, a fair argument can be made that the Constitutional framework established by the framers is undemocratic since it contains very strong anti-majoritarian constraints. Moreover, even if the legal blue print does establish a democracy or republic, America as it stands today does not function as one. Rather, its political system is more of a forum for competing elite interests dominated by special interest groups and wealthy individuals or corporations than popular engagement. Secondly, assuming for the sake of the argument that America is a democracy and has a declared goal of promoting democracy are the true sources of the development of its foreign policy, the historical record simply doesn’t testify to this fact. Rather, the historical record tends to reveal that America has rather consistently overthrown or marginalized democratic regimes that don’t conform to its strategic interests or has completely ignored the oppression of nascent democratic movements. This occurred in Cuba, Haiti, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, etc. The most recent example is isolating the democratically elected regime in Palestine, HAMAS. The notion that America is interested in promoting liberal democratic capitalism doesn’t explain its bizarre choice of undemocratic allies including Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Wahhabi Fundamentalist Saudi Arabia, kleptocratic Musharraf in Pakistan, just to name a few. There is little, or at best contradictory, evidence that shows that the will of the people has had a substantial effect on governing American foreign policy or that the concern with promotion of democracy is what motivates it.

Capitalism Determines American Behavior: The third analytical approach, while accurate to a certain degree, doesn’t explain why America supports certain regimes abroad that doesn’t lead to a direct corporate or class interest, such as America’s unflinching support for Israel, its invoking of the NATO alliance to contain Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and Bosnia, or its construction of military bases in Central Asia. None of these regions has significant connections with American economic interests. There are also clear examples of certain countries behaving in a manner that clearly doesn’t benefit American economic or corporate interests and America failed to intervene - such as its muted response to the slow shift to the Left in Latin America, especially in Venezuela where Hugo Chavez’s use of oil is clearly a political tool.

A New Theory of Understanding American Behaviour

Instead of using these conceptual frameworks to understand the underlying impulses of American behavior around the world, I propose a new approach: to simply treat America as hegemonic power that, like other hegemonic powers, engages in certain pathological behaviors. In particular, I posit that American foreign policy, intelligence operations, and military actions are guided less by the interests of a particular individual who is in the office of Presidency and guided more by the internal compulsion that is innate within all hegemonic powers. . The primary goal of a hegemonic power is to maintain its hegemony and it does so by eliminating competitors from challenging it or by preventing weak powers from forming a counter hegemony. This basic instinct supersedes all epochs of American history. Thus, I reject the notion that America is a reluctant superpower or that it has been historically isolationist. It also surpasses purported bipartisan divisions. Thus, I reject the notion that any particular group or party is interested in world domination and others are opposed to it. Instead, I propose that all of the political, economic, and military elites take American hegemony for granted and rather than limiting it, they merely disagree on the proper methodology of preserving or expanding it.

If we presume that America is not primarily motivated by liberal democratic capitalism, but by the internal and external pressures that all hegemonies are subjected to and that its primary concern is to prevent the rise of a new competitor following the demise of its previous competitor (the USSR) and to prevent collusion of states, we can deduce without a doubt that America will attempt to keep Russia down and prevent the formation of an anti-hegemonic coalition (Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Russia, China, etc). In particular, it will utilize its already existing allies to work against them (NATO, Saudi Arabia, Israel) or develop new allies to serve as a counterbalance to their anti-hegemony (Central Asia, Ethiopia, and India). It will also seek to insert itself in areas where these anti-hegemonic forces need to be in order to develop their counter-hegemony, this area ranges from Eastern Africa into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Indian Subcontinent. These deductions are not only reasonable, but are the same logical conclusions that American strategic analysts have arrived at. More importantly, it explains exactly how America as a state has behaved since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Textual Support for the Theory of Hegemonic Drive

In order to determine if this theory of hegemony is accurate, it is necessary to focus on how American power actually operates. This can be done by scrutinizing: (1) strategic proposals and programs, (2) political maneuvering, (3) economic policies, and (4) military actions; or the lack thereof of all four categories.

The first step in this analysis involves looking at those who develop strategic programs. Thus, rather than looking at candidate’s promises during campaign season, I propose to look at those who develop foreign policy: national security advisors, military analysts, and think tanks. After all, given that most American presidents have been either senators or governors, why should it be presumed that they suddenly acquire knowledge of world events and can develop foreign policy upon reaching office? Presidents these days rarely write their own speeches, so it should not be presumed that they develop their own policy. A class of intellectuals, bureaucrats, and military personalities are the true drafters of American foreign policy and strategies and there is a surprising consensus between them that surpasses bipartisan divisions and transitions between administrations.

Their are three hypotheses I have constructed based on my initial analysis: (1) there is a huge discrepancy between the statements of American heads of state and how America actually behaved, (2) there is a strong overlap of conclusions by strategic thinkers, regardless of political party or administration or historical era, and (3) there is almost a direct convergence of strategic proposals and how America actually behaves.

If one examines American strategic analysts in the post-Cold War Era, there are three general tendencies that exist between the various national security advisers, secretaries and undersecretaries of defense, joints chief of staff, political scientists, and fellows at think tanks: (1) knock out competitors and counter-hegemonic alliances, (2) expand the EU and NATO, and (3) specifically contain three countries (Russia, China, and Iran). The following three strategic analysts who have served as important foreign policy guides in some capacity to presidents or current presidential candidates: (a) Paul Wolfowitz (a neoconservative Republican) , (b) Samuel Huntington (a centrist Democrat), and (c) Zbigniew Brzenzski (a liberal Democrat).

These three individuals represent purportedly different angles of the American political spectrum, but rather than divergences, there are several important commonalities between the “Grand Strategy” proposals by these, and other, strategic thinkers. While they differ over why American hegemony is justifiable (promote capitalism versus democracy versus international stability), they largely agree on the assumptions highlighted above.

Wolfowitz: Paul Wolfowitz was a former US ambassador to Indonesia, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, President of the World Bank. In 1992, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department published a document entitled “Defense Planning Guidance” which essentially contained a strategy plan clearly designed to prevent the emergence of a new rival. The drafting of this document was supervised by Paul Wolfowitz (Pentagon’s Under Secretary under Bush I). In it, it is absolutely clear that the primary concern of the Bush I administration was the preservation of American hegemony. “Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.” This excerpt leads to two propositions: (1) America must prevent the rise of a competitor or an anti-hegemonic coalition and (2) the areas of interest in particular are Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the Former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia. The general conclusion than is that Latin America, the Caribbean, or Africa is strategically relevant to the fulfillment of these objectives. If one examines how America has behaved since the fall of the Soviet Union, it has done very little in non-Eurasian countries. Interventions in Haiti and Somalia were miniscule compared to the bombing campaigns in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq or the American military presence being established in central Asia, Southwest Asia, and East Asia. Some may argue that the neoconservatives are extremists and do not represent how American foreign policy actually operates. The scrutiny of other strategic analysts from the other end of the political spectrum, however, is surprisingly similar.

Huntington: Samuel Huntington served as an adviser to President Lyndon Johnson and also served as the White House Coordinator of Security Planning for the National Security Council between 1977 and 1978. In 1996, Samuel Huntington published “The Clash Civilization” in which he too, bluntly declared that in order “To preserve Western civilization in the face of declining Western power, it is in the interest of the United States and European countries:

i. To achieve greater political, economic, and military integration and to coordinate their policies so as to preclude states from other civilizations exploiting differences among them;

ii. To incorporate into the European Union and NATO the Western states of Central Europe that is, the Visegrad countries, the Baltic republics, Slovenia, and Croatia;

iii. To encourage the “Westernization” of Latin America and, as far as possible, the close alignment of Latin American countries with the West;

iv. To restrain the development of the conventional and unconventional military power of Islamic and Sinic countries;

v. To slow the drift of Japan away from the West and toward accommodation with China;

vi. To accept Russia as the core state of Orthodoxy and a major regional power with legitimate interests in the security of its southern borders;

vii. To maintain Western technological and military superiority over the other civilizations;

viii. And, most important, to recognize that Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict in a multicivilizational world.” (p 311-312 of “The Clash of Civilizations and the New World Order”)

In elaborating the Chinese-Islamic connection, he goes on to say that:

“China’s conflicts with the West, on the other hand, mean that it will value partnership with other anti-Western states, of which Islam furnishes the largest and most influential number. In addition, China’s increasing needs for oil are likely to impel it to expand its relations with Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia as well as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Such an arms-for-oil axis, one energy expert in 1994, “won’t have to take orders from London, Paris, or Washington anymore.’” (p 240)

At a first glance, Huntington’s approach appears to be far more diplomatic than Wolfowitz’s approach. He calls for permitting the international system to conform along civilizational spheres and suggests that the US simply police the fault lines between them. However, the objectives he proclaims are more indicative of the same concern for the preservation of American hegemony than creating an international system based on civilizations. The expansion of the EU and NATO has more to do with preventing the resurgence of Russian influence in that region, a point specifically argued by Brzezinski. Moreover, the concern in preventing an Islamic and Sinic military alliance is focused on Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and China from developing a network of military exchange that would obviously create an imbalance against the current security system which centers around Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Huntington seems to contradict himself: on the one hand he posits that the world is divided into civilizations and America should respect that, but why is it the concern of America to prevent collusion between civilizations? How does an Sinic-Islamic coalition threaten the overall structural integrity of the civilizational international system that he advances? Wouldn’t cross-civilizational interactions indicate that civilizations themselves are not necessarily adverse to one another’s interests? This underlying flaw exposes that Huntington’s concern is less with global instability in the international system and more with dealing with a counter-hegemonic challenge to American supremacy. Preventing the rise of a Sinic-Islamic coalition, incidentally, is not only shared by Huntington and Wolfowitz, but also between Huntington and Brzenzinski.

Brzezinski : Zbigniew Brzezinski was a former US National Security Advisor under Jimmy Carter and is currently one of Obama’s picks for foreign policy advisor. A year after Huntington published his work, Zbigniew Brzezinski, (1997) published “The Grand Chessboard.” In the foreword, he declared “The ultimate objective of American policy should be benign and visionary: to shape a truly cooperative global community, in keeping with long-range trends and with the fundamental interests of humankind. But in the meantime, it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America. The formulation of a comprehensive and integrated Eurasian geostrategy is therefore the purpose of this book.” (p iv of “The Grand Chessboard”) Later on, he describes the greatest threat to the international system as being an antihegemonic coalition between China, Russia, and Iran. “Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an “antihegemonic” coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances.” (p 55). Like Huntington, Brzenzsiki calls for the expansion of NATO and the EU as well: “The enlargement of NATO and the EU would serve to reinvigorate Europe’s own waning sense of a larger vocation, while consolidating, to the benefit of both America and Europe, the democratic gains won through the successful termination of the Cold War.”

All of the strategists mentioned above generally agree that American hegemony is necessary, either for global stability or for the preservation of its own self-interest. They also agree that Russian resurgence must be contained and a counter-hegemonic coalition must not be formed to challenge American hegemony. All three strategists specifically recommended stifling the convergence of the power of three countries in particular: Russia, China, and Iran. These strategic objectives have a stronger explanatory power in understanding American behavior after the collapse of the Soviet Union than merely looking at the commitments made by Presidents, America’s democratic roots, or corporate interest.

The Historical Record Supports The Notion that America is Acting to Preserve Its Hegemony

Knock Out Competitor Russia: The hegemonic theory of power reveals that American actions are clearly designed to prevent the resurgence of its previous competitor, Russia. If this is true, it explains:

(1) American military spending increased following the collapse of the Soviet Union rather than “demobilizing,” (New York Times)

(2) why both the EU and NATO expanded in the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union into Eastern European countries, (BBC)

(3) why America invoked NATO to institute a bombing campaign in the former Yugoslavia to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing but did little to stop ethnic cleansing by Croats when they took over areas controlled by the fleeing Serbians (Mother Jones) or why America ignores ethnic cleansing in other regions of the world, such as in Israel, Sudan, Indonesia, South Africa, or the Congo for that matter,

(4) why America is promoting a missile defense shield program in Eastern European countries such as Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Poland, (BBC)

(5) why Russia opposes it, and

(6) why Russia and America are competing for spheres of influence in Georgia as it fragments.

Knock Out Counter-Hegemonic Alliance: If my theory of hegemony is correct, then American actions are also clearly designed to prevent or stifle the rise of a counter-hegemonic challenge between the Sinic and Muslim world. It is unsurprising that every Muslim country (Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan) that has developed either a trade or military relationship with China has recently or is currently being targeted for an American intervention.

• Pakistan: Between 1980 and 1991 the three chief recipients of Chinese arms were Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq. In 1989, Pakistan and China signed a 10 year memorandum of understanding for military cooperation in the fields of purchase, joint research and development, joint production, transfer of technology, as well as export to third countries through mutual agreement. In 1993, a supplementary agreement provided Chinese credits for Pakistani arms purchases. China has helped Pakistan create production facilities for jet aircraft, tanks, artillery, and missiles. China allegedly furnished Pakistan with uranium for enrichment, advice on bomb design, and possibly allowed Pakistan to explode a nuclear device at a Chinese test site. China supplied Pakistan with M-11, 300-kilomater range ballistic missiles that could deliver nuclear weapons, in the process violating a commitment to the US. In return, China has secured midair refueling technology and Stinger missiles from Pakistan.

• Iraq: From 1981 to 2001, China was the second largest supplier of weapons and arms to Iraq, supplying over 18 percent of Iraq’s weapons imports. Prior to the American invasion, it controlled approximately 5.8 percent of Iraq’s annual imports. Chinese oil companies were able to acquire a 22-year long deal for future oil exploration in southern Iraq. China also sold $2 million in fiber optic cables that some experts believed were used for military purposes such as to integrate radar systems that bolstered its air defenses.

• Iran: Iran received its fair share of military assistance from China as well. During Iran-Iraq War, China supplied Iran with 22 percent of its arms. In 1989, Iran became China’s single largest arms supplier. In 1990, China and Iran signed a 10 year understanding on scientific cooperation and military technology transfers. In 1992, President Rafsanjani accompanied Iranian nuclear experts to a visit to Pakistan and then went to China where they signed another agreement for nuclear cooperation. In February 1993 – China agreed to build two 300 MW nuclear reactors in Iran. China transferred nuclear technology and information to Iran, it trained Iranian scientists and engineers, and provided Iran with a calutron enriching device. In 1995 the US pressured China into canceling the sale of the two 300 MW reactors. China is also a major supplier of missiles and missile technology to Iran. In the 1980s, Silkworm missiles were delivered through North Korea. Between 1994 and 1995, hundreds of missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools were exchanged. China also licensed production in Iran of Chinese surface-to-surface missiles.

 

• Not only have military relationships developed between Iran and China and Pakistan and China, but all three countries have engaged in cooperation. For example, Pakistan trained Iranian scientists. In November 1992, Pakistan, Iran, and China agreed to work together on nuclear projects

• Sudan: China is the single largest investor in the oil industry in Sudan and gets around 6% of its oil from Sudan. While it might not seem that much, recall that when oil production dropped by 10%, it triggered a massive economic recession in the US. Cutting off 6% to China could have devastating effects to its economic growth. Moreover, China has a rather lucrative arms trade with Sudan. China was the major supplier of antipersonnel and antitank mines after 1980 to Sudan. From 2004 to 2006, China sold over $55 million worth of small arms to the Sudanese government, which used to arm Arab militias to engage in ethnic cleansing.

This information reveals that their may very well be a counter-hegemonic challenge to American dominance. Since the strategists highlighted above have specifically declared that this should not be allowed, it makes perfect sense that American military presence exists smack dab in the counter-hegemonic triangle (the area between Russia, Iran, and China). Central Asia is comprised of countries such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Krygistan, Tajikstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

It is no surprise that:

(1) the current National Security Adviser to Bush II, Stephen Hadley has been responsible for assisting Indian-American relations to serve as a counterbalance to China, a prime example of which is the current Indian-American nuclear cooperation.

(2) the construction of US military bases in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan

(3) the desire for US military presence in Pakistan in spite of the fact that this will most likely lead to the dissolution of the country, but this would free up India’s northern border and enable it to further challenge Chinese regional dominance,

(4) US and Russian competition in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan,

(5) this region contains the Kazakhstan-China pipeline which, in addition to transporting oil to China from Kazakhstan, will also be used by Russia to transport oil from Siberia to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

(6) The US government declaring Sudan to be engaging in genocide (a) in spite of the fact that the UN, African Union, the European Union, and Amnesty International have all explicitly rejected the term and (b) the US is building the largest CIA office in Eastern Africa in Sudan.

Conclusion

The declarations of American heads of state, the nature of its political and economic system, do not account for reasonable explanations for how America behaves in the world today. American presidents have often contradicted themselves in promoting domestic and foreign policies or have given weak reasons or fictitious reasons to justify foreign interventions. They lack the expertise and power to develop and effectuate global strategies. This does not explain how America behaves in the world. America is neither a functional democracy nor a functional republic, but a plutocratic republic. It has often opposed the will of the people within the country and the will of the people of other countries in foreign policy engagements. It has gone so far as to overthrow or suppress or marginalize legitimate democratic movements. Democracy cannot be used to explain how America behaves in the world. While there have been the occasional foreign interventions and covert operations to protect specific economic interests, there are plenty of non-economic foreign policy maneuvers that America has also engaged in. In fact, it has sometimes engaged in actions that were opposed to its economic interests. This does not explain how America behaves in the world.

However, if we presume America is a hegemonic power and all hegemonies possess certain characteristics, how America behaves is rather easy to explain. Hegemonies, by their very nature, seek domination and control. They are adverse to other hegemonies forming or, if no one country is powerful enough to become a hegemon itself, then to prevent the formation of a counter-hegemonic alliance between weaker states. Naturally, hegemonies mystify the nature of their domination and control. If people or nations were aware of the hegemonic order, it would be deconstructed. For this reason, hegemonies pursue their interests in a discreet fashion or they attempt to induce benefits to get other peoples, nations, and states to adhere to its domination. If this is the case, then the best way to preserve hegemony would be to use other parties to effectuate the policy objectives of the hegemon. The hegemon will only intervene in affairs when there is a critical mass. If this is true, then one would predict that after the Soviet Union, America would not demobilize its defense apparatus, but maintain it and, if possible, to actually increase it. It would pit powers against one another. The natural competitors would probably be China, Russia, and India. Just like the Americans used China against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it is conceivable that America would attempt to use one of the challengers against the other. In this case, the best candidate would be India since it has a history of hostility with China and it lacks a convergence of strategic interest. Russia and China both have nominal connections to communism in the past. While the Sino-Soviet split is still fresh in their memory, the growing industrialization of China puts it in the path of convergence with Russia, which has huge energy reserves and in opposition to India, which it is competing against. Thus, one would predict that America would use Eastern Europe as a levy to contain Russia and India as a levy to contain China. To prevent either country from using the Middle East as a levy against America, one would predict that America builds bases smack dab in the middle of the “Counter-Hegemonic Triangle.” The War on Terrorism and the War on Iraq have practically achieved this accomplishment, with the exception of Pakistan and Iran. One can predict increasing military ties between Central Asian countries, Eastern Europe, India, and America as well as Chinese and Russian attempts to exert influence in other regions, such as Latin America and Africa.

These deductions are substantiated by both the strategic programs issued by various national security advisors and also by the conduct of America following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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