Global Intifada

Shaykh Abu Ammar Yasser Qadhi, on the Al Maghrib Forums, wrote the following:

“Jinnzaman, I find your sudden conversion, along with the existence of your student, a rather fortuitous coincidence. In any case, I will leave the tactics and intentions that others employ to Allah , as we have been commanded to do.”

The topic of the thread was on Tawassul and Shaykh Yasser’s comment pertained to a series of questions I posed to Br. Tilmeedh who was providing proofs and evidences in favor of the practice of Tawassul. I interjected in the debate to question whether the fact that the majority of the ‘Ulema approved of Tawassul could be quantitatively proven and whether, regardless if it was proven or not, was even a valid legal principle.

The topic of this post is not Tawassul itself but rather, the notion that the majority of the ‘Ulema can constitute as a legal proof in extracting rulings from the sources of legislation or whether their opinions are merely supplemental or whether it is not a proof at all.

The reason why I found Shaykh Yasser’s comment awkward was because of his use of the term “conversion” as if I had exchanged one set of dogma (the Traditionalist) for another (the Salafi). Simply because I ask questions or express doubts or present criticisms of a principle does not necessarily mean that I have abandoned something. In my opinion, the rational proofs presented in the Ashari madhab are not legally binding upon me as a Muslim, only the logical conclusions since the logical conclusions themselves are derived directly from the sources of legislation which are obligatory to follow. However, simply because I am critical of some of the Ashari proofs for the existence of God does not logically imply that I reject the existence of God or the Ashari madhab itself. I am not criticizing God, but merely the rational proof for the existence of God and since the rational proof is not from God Himself, but the logical inferences of a man, then I feel that I am not obliged to believe in them. Hence, I can reject every single proof for the existence of Allah presented by the Ashari madhab and still be both a Muslim and an Ashari.

The expression of doubt in one matter does not negate certainty in other matters.

The purpose of this post is to express some more criticisms of a particular principle in Islamic Jurisprudence. My reason for doing so is merely to compile a series of criticisms that have been presented against this principle so that I may learn the proper method of refuting it. It is a habit of mine that I partake in whenever I properly want to understand something. I gather all of the refutations on a particular topic in a systematic manner before engaging in a thorough study of all the counter-refutations. I find this method to be quite an effective manner of engaging in polemics. Rather than going through one argument after another and responding to each one individually, sometimes it is prudent to pre-emptively respond to arguments before they are even raised. So merely because I pose questions isn’t an indication of doubt or “conversion”.

Anyhow, I digress. Back to the main discussion.

One of the most potent forms of scrutiny that many Salafis and Modernists have raised against the Traditionalist paradigm is its principles that the majority of the ‘Ulema can deviate from error. Term “majority” can have two possible meanings: it can mean the majority of the mujtahid imams and ‘Ulema of exceptional repute regardless of era or it can mean the majority of the ‘Ulema of a particular era.

The first point to be made is, as is usually the case, the evidence regarding this matter is conflicting, at least from the perspective of the laymen. Both sides of the divide seem to present capable proofs and criticisms of the opposing argument. It is important to note that their is genuine ikhtilaaf in this matter. The Hanbali madhab doesn’t ascribe consensus beyond the era of the companions. The other schools differ over the actual meaning of ‘consensus’ and whether it applies to the Ummah as a whole or the ‘Ulema and which ‘Ulema in particular (mujtahid mutlaqs as opposed to other madhaib). Imam Ghazzali has a very good discussion of the various positions and their justifications in his Mustasfa, a text on Usool al Fiqh. If their is genuine ikhtilaaf on this matter, this is clearly an indication that the proofs propounded by each party cannot be definitive for if their was such a high degree of ikhtilaaf, the claim of definitiveness is weak.

Secondly, there are multiple examples that imply that the Ummah will be divided and that it is concievable for the majority to have deviated. The first of which is commonly used by Salafis to justify their perception that the Ummah has, as is indicated by the hadeeth, indeed divided into sects: “And this Ummah will divide into seventy-three sects all of which except one will go to Hell and they (the saved group) are those who are upon what land my companions are upon (or those who follow my way and the way of my companions).” [At-Tirmidhi] The problem with the Salafi application of this hadeeth, of course, is that they apply it on matters of fiqh to the Ummah as a whole and then, in their own minds, divide the Ummah into groups. For example, the separate the Deobandis and classify them as one “sect”, the Barelwis as another “sect”, the Maturidis another “sect”, the Sufis another “sect”, and the Tableeghi Jamaat as another “sect”. In reality, all of these groups are interrelated. The differences between the Deobandis and the Barelwis is over a very a handful of issues (issues that they vehemently disagree over, but nonetheless, quantitatively smaller than compared to the Salafis and the Deobandis). In reality, the Deobandis, Barelwis, and Tableeghi Jamaat all unite on the same aqidah (the Maturidi school), the same fiqh (the Hanafi madhab), and the same basic tariqas (Qadiri, Chisti, Naqshbandi, and Suhawardi). Hence, the Salafi labelling of them into different “sects” is unrealistic and the hadeeth cannot be applied to it since the definition of a “sect” is with regards to aqeedah is not even applicable here since they do not differ in aqeedah but utilize the same sources and, secondly, differences in aqeedah do not apply to fiqh. This raises an important question: are the arguments for and against the majority being a legislative criterion apply to aqeedah or fiqh? Do they indicate that the majority of the Ummah will not deviate from its aqeedah or from its fiqh? The focus of the subsequent discussion will focus on aqeedah, even though this principle is discussed in the context of fiqh since if one is deviant in one’s aqeedah, then one’s fiqh, by definition, is deviant as well since the latter is contingent upon the former. No deeds will be accepted by the murtad, kaffir, or mushrik due to lack of iman. Hence, if it is possible for the majority of the Ummah or the ‘Ulema to be deviant in their aqeedah, it is a necessary corollary that their fiqh is nullified. It is untenable to accept a person’s deeds if their beliefs do not fulfill the basic requirement of the acceptance of that deed and that is iman. Therefore, the query as to whether or not the majority of the Ummah constitutes a legal proof in fiqh must first meet the standard of rigorousness in aqeedah for it does not, then the latter cannot obviously apply since if the higher standard is unfulfilled, the lower standard cannot obviously be met either.

In order to understand to further understand this question, we need to scrutinize the claim that “the Ummah will not unite upon error”. This hadeeth, firstly, is a weak hadeeth, as is attested by Mufti Taqi Usmani and many other contemporary ‘Ulema. Secondly, the hadeeth itself is ambiguous. It says that the Ummah will not attain unanimity in error, it does not state that it is conceivable for the majority to be in error. The standard of unanimity is much higher than the standard for the majority. First and foremost, in previous Ummahs, it should be noted that the majority was not precluded from misguidance. Humankind was created in a state of belief starting with Adam (as) and Huwa (as). Shirk did not occur until the era after Nuh (as) when his disciples were taken as idols and idol-worship was introduced into humanity. Their are three points to be made: that the majority of humanity, which was originally in a state of belief, can go into a state of disbelief as is evident from the descendants of Adam (as) and in our own time where Islam is not the majority religion (although it is quickly going to become one). The second point within this point is that between Ummahs, the very reason why Allah (swt) sent prophets and messengers (as) was to correct the deviations that had occurred within the majority of the Ummah. Had the majority been on the straight path, it would not have made sense to send Prophets (as). The third point is that within a particular Ummah itself, the Qur’an illustrates that it is conceivable for the majority of an Ummah to engage in kufr or shirk as was the case with the Bani Israel when Musa (as) left them and they took to worshipping a golden calf. Thus, these three examples show that it is conceivable that: humanity as a whole can become deviant in aqeedah, Ummahs may become deviant between one another and one of the reasons why Prophets (as) have been sent is to correct a particular Ummah from the deviancy of a previous Ummah, and thirdly, that within an Ummah, it is conceivable for the majority to deviate in its aqeedah. The purpose of these arguments is to illustrate not that it is necessary for the majority to deviate simply because past generations did so, but rather, it is possible or conceivable that the majority can deviate.

In response to these claims are two counter-propositions: the shariah of the previous ummah is no longer a legally binding reality and that the Prophet (saw) was sent for all of mankind. The problem with the first claim is that it is in a legal context and not a metaphysical (aqeedah) concept. Certain actions or deeds of forms of worship may have been acceptable or prohibited in previous generations, but it would not be logically or textually possible for them to have engaged in great variances in aqeedah. Hence, although prostration out of respect is prohibited in our Ummah although it was permissible in the era of Yusuf (as), it is impossible for an action or belief that constituted Shirk or Kufr to be acceptable in our Ummah. So the notion that something that it was permissible in a previous Ummah for the majority to deviate but is no longer applicable today because what was acceptable in a previous Ummah is no longer acceptable is false. Firstly, because it is in the fiqh sense and not the aqeedah sense. Secondly, it has been shown in the Qur’an, as was illustrated above, that the majority of a particular Ummah can be deviant in aqeedah and so can subsequent geenrations. Hence, it is, at the least, conceivable, although not necessary. With regards to the second claim, the Prophet (saw) has been sent, unlike previous Prophets (as) to all of mankind and the ahkam mentioned in the Qur’an and other sources of legislation are not binding on a particular Ummah, but all of mankind until the Day of Judgment. Of course, this proposition is absolutely true and anyone who rejects the finality of the Prophethood of Rasulullah (saw) or the universal address of the Qur’an and the applicability of the laws mentioned therein, such a person would leave the fold of Islam. However, this proposition does not constitute a proof that the majority of the Muslims will ever be immune from error or revert back to disbelief. Even in the time of the Prophet (saw), reverted back to disbelief and in the era of the Sahabah (ra), the formation of sects took place. Hence it is a historical proof that Muslims as groups can both leave Islam and also form sects. Thus, the principle of the Prophet (saw) being the final messenger and that his (saw) dawah was to apply to all of humanity does not constitute a proof that once mankind becomes Muslim, they will necessarily stay Muslim or not form a sect. What is possible for an individual may be possible for the majority. The hadeeth “My Ummah will not unite upon error”, albeit weak, even if it was presumed to be a proof, simply means that it is not possible that every Muslim would make an error (whether in aqeedah or fiqh is a separate question). This hadeeth, in no way, precludes the majority from being deviant. However, a verse of the Qur’an attests that Islam will dominate (the world) regardless if the Mushrikun dislike it. This verse, although strong, could mean domination in a political sense or in numbers. One possible rebuttal is the fact that kufr and shirk will return to the Ummah and that all of Islam will be lost except for the Shahadah which will be recited. When no one recites the Shahadah, then the end of the world will commence followed by the Day of Judgment. This latter hadeeth shows that it is conceivable that, even for a moment, that the Ummah will return to a complete state of disbelief.

The last question to be posed regarding the majority of the Ummah being correct is what this term actually means. Is it applicable to the mujtahid imams and the ‘Ulema of repute or is it applied to the Ummah as a whole? Firstly, it should be noted that immunity is granted to neither. The laymen makes mistakes in his application of Islam on a regular basis. The overwhelming majority of the Muslims today are in such a state where their aqeedah and their fiqh and their tasawwuf is probably incorrect in one form or another. The signs of the day of judgment, if considered a proof, indicate that the majority of the Ummah will become deviant again. With regards to the Mujtahid Imams, they are not infallible. It is known that each of the mujtahid imams made an error in their own regards that were later corrected or elucidated by subsequent generations. Immunity is not granted even to the Sahabah (ra) as individuals, although it is guaranteed to them as a class. Of course, many would argue that the agreement of the mujtahid imams is source of legislation, however, that is not the question. The question is whether if the majority of the mujtahid imams or the majority of the ‘Ulema agreeing is a source of legislation. The Ummah, as a whole, has many such individuals, not limited to the creedal differences. When we say “the majority” of the ‘Ulema of repute, are we referring to the Sunni imams or the Shi’i ones or the Mutazili or the Khwariji or all of the above? If the requirement is for the majority of the ‘Ummah or the ‘Ulema, then it would require to take all of the different opinions in both aqeedah and fiqh into considerations. It is highly suspect that the majority are truly uniform if the sects are not factored into this equation. By excluding the sects, it is far easier to prove that their is a majority of the ‘Ulema agreeing on a matter. This definition seems tautological and is not based on sufficient evidences or rational proofs.

Of course, someone will point out that the majority opinion has an important role in legislation since it is the standard by which hadeeth are authenticated. However, the overwhelming majority of hadeeth are not mutawattir and thus, by its own definition, the mere fact that the majority of the ‘Ulema agree that the books of hadeeth are legitimate, is not a proof since the the majority of the hadeeth themselves are not derived through multiple chains but rather, most of them are singular in nature. Furthermore, simply because a standard of hadeeth criticism is acceptable in one field, does not make them acceptable in another. In other words, such a principle is not acceptable in aqeedah where only the mutawattir hadeeth will suffice.

This is a summary of every criticism I could think of against the ‘majority of the Ummah’ constituting a proof or at least a supplement for a particular opinion.

Now all I gotta do is compile a refutation of all the claims made above.

D’oh!

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