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The Liberal Justification for an Islamic Revolution in Pakistan
On November 3rd, “President Musharraf” returned to his status as dictator by declaring emergency rule in Pakistan. This declaration announced the suspension of the Constitution and the termination of the chief justice of the Supreme Court, who has been a thorn in the side of the executive by exercising his institution’s right of judicial review. Troops have been deployed to place the justices on house arrest, to blackout all independent media except for state-run media, and have participated in the arrest of over 1500 human rights activists and lawyers. Additionally, all land and mobile telephone lines have been cut in the capital, Islamabad. While Musharraf has argued that the reason behind the imposition of dictatorship has been to fight extremism and restore the economy (because we all know that there is no greater way to encourage investment then by dissolving the government and creating the conditions of anarchy), the more reasonable explanation for his actions lies in the fact that the supreme court was going to decide whether he was allowed to remain as army chief of staff while also running in last month’s election.
The underlying issue now is not the legality of his actions, but what the proper remedy is. What course should the average Pakistani take in responding to these flagrant violations of governance? In this post, I argue that the liberal tradition authorizes an Islamic Revolution to occur in Pakistan in order to establish a form of governance that is in accordance with the Shari’ah.
Perhaps the best liberal thinker to write on the subject of revolt is John Locke. In his “Second Treatise of Civil Governmentâ€, Locke sets forth the reasons under which he believes that popular revolt becomes lawful. Locke argues that a social contract binds all political actors with the people. The supreme formal political authority is the legislature because it is a representative the people, who are the true source of all power within the state. Since the legislature has a fiduciary relationship with the people, if they attempt to subvert the will of the people and impinge upon their liberties and properties, then they may exercise their right to remove or alter the legislature. Yet, this power can not be exercised until the government itself is first dissolved. On the other hand, if the executive uses his power and authority to subvert the legislature the situation is much more dire since he, in effect, enters into a state of war with the people who have the right to restore the full powers of the legislature. In other words, if a leader uses force without authority, then the people may utilize force against him. However, if there is a legal remedy available, then the right to revolt is restricted.
The underlying purpose of government is the preservation of self-interest of the people. Under certain circumstances, it may be necessary to suspend the ordinary rule of law. However, such emergencies are to be viewed with the highest scrutiny and whatever informal authorization of such power is given to the executive, it must automatically rescinded if it becomes apparent that the actions of the state are more concerned with their own ends than for pursuing the interests of the people. If such a situation occurs, then the people have no choice but to revolt and take rulership into their own hands:
“If a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design [to oppress] visible to the people, and they cannot but feel, what they lie under, and see, whither they are going; ’tis not to be wondered, that they should then rouse themselves, and endeavor to put the rule into such hands, which may secure to them the ends for which government was first erected.”
Locke goes even further and blames any violence that emanates from revolt squarely upon the shoulders of the oppressive leadership who made such conditions necessary:
“If any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbors. If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has for peace sake, to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered, what a kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefits of robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an admirable peace betwixt the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf?”
To summarize the Lockean justification for revolt: (1) the authority of a government stems from the people, (2) if the legislature conflicts with the will of the people, then they may dissolve it if necessary, (3) if the executive conflicts with the will of the people, then they may revolt if no legal means is available, and (4) any violence or harm that occurs should not be blamed upon revolutionaries who seek to restore the correct purpose of government, but upon the oppressive rulers who necessitate such actions. With that said, let us now turn to Musharraf’s actions and see how Locke might interpret them and whether he would feel that an revolution would be justified.
Musharraf’s authority was initiated by a bloodless coup de ‘etat when democratically, albeit corrupt, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attempted to end his life while trying to withdrawn Pakistan from the Kargil crisis in the late 1990s. Musharraf, pursuing his own self-preservation, called up a few generals and turned the tables on Sharif and came to power. There was no imminent harm upon Pakistan at all at the time, except for war with India. However, avoiding war with India was exactly what Prime Minister Sharif was trying to do in attempting to thwart Musharraf. Over the years, Musharraf engaged in a variety of different actions in order to legitimize his rule. He argued that he was attempting to preserve the unity of the country, promoting security by fighting against an amorphous group of “Islamic extremists†or “terroristsâ€. For the most part, his military actions have backfired; Islamic militancy has become more entrenched now than ever before, especially after following the Lal Masjid debacle. However, as weak as these justifications are, the suspension of the Constitution and political processes is absolutely uncalled for. While it is true that there are many extremists in the country, there is no imminent threat that requires the suspension of the Constitution and the judiciary. The actions of Musharraf illustrate that just like he is not operating in the interests of the people, but his own self-interest, just like when he came to power in 1999.
Musharraf’s actions immediately after declaring emergency rule lend credence to the assertion that he is operating on preserving his own self-interest at the expense of the people. Instead of going after extremists, he suspended the Constitution, shut down the Supreme Court, arrested hundreds of lawyers and human rights activists, and blacked out the media. The purported “threat†of Islamic extremism had nothing do with these actions. These actions illustrate clearly that Musharraf is not pursuing the will of the people, but the very opposite. He has not taken any significant steps against any Islamic extremists whatsoever. The current use of the military and police forces have been directed at his political opposition, not Islamic extremists. Moreover, he has cut off every medium, legal and technological, for the expression of the will of the people. Any objections to the actions of the executive can not be presented since the judiciary has been cut off, both by cutting out judges and lawyers from the legal process, and the independent media, which can be deemed the vox populi. Since Musharraf is promoting his own personal interest above the masses and has forbidden all legal means to remedy these issues, he has authorized a popular revolt against his rule under Lockean theory of revolution.
Now that it has become clear that the masses may revolt against Musharraf and seek to institute the rule of law again, there are two remaining issues: (a) what form of government should be implemented to replace the present one and (b) what means are to be used to establish such a government.
In terms of the method of government, it is clear that dictatorship is not a valid alternative. One can argue that democracy should be restored in Pakistan, but there are two problems with this. Firstly, democracy has proven time and time again to be nothing but a failure in Pakistan, and many other Muslim countries. Secondly, a democracy must be constrained by the will of the people. Since the people of Pakistan are, by and large, Muslim, it is important to recognize that there is a covenant more elevated than the social contract between the Pakistani people: that is the covenant that they have with Allah
(subhana wa ta’ala). Muslims are bound by their pledge to worship only one Lord and not associate partners with Him and to follow the Shari’ah that has been revealed to the Prophet Muhammad
(sallahu alayhi wa sallam). The Shari’ah is not solely a legal system with political aspects, but a wholistic ethical code that governs worship, dietary laws, human interactions, criminal law, commercial transactions, family law, etc. By virtue of the pledge of Alastoo, all Muslims are bound by the dictates of the Shari’ah and their will must conform to it. All political power is derived from the people and if the people in question are Muslims, then their authority to legislate is subjugated to the authority of the Sovereign by nature of their pledge to Him. Thus, the only model of government that is acceptable in replacing Musharraf’s regime will be an Islamic one.
Now that it has been established that the people have the authority to revolt against their ruler and establish a new form of government that must be Islamic, the question arises as to what method they may use to do so. Under Islamic law, violent rebellion is only authorized if a leader has apostated and his apostasy will have a negative effect on the political system and society. However, under Lockean theory, since Musharraf has violated the social compact between himself and the people, violence is a justifiable manner of revolt. Since the form of government that the people must choose is an Islamic one, liberal philosophy justifies an Islamic Revolution to occur in Pakistan in order to restore the legitimacy of the state.
Note of Caution:
I wanted to take a moment to clarify my post. I am not calling for a violent Islamic Revolution to occur in Pakistan. I specifically stated that under Islamic law, such a revolution would not be deemed permissible. The purpose of my post was to point out the incoherency of liberalism and how if one takes its philosophy to a logical extreme, it can produce contradictory results. My hope was to attempt to illustrate that much of our contemporary political and legal philosophy is rooted on extremely shabby grounds and are, at the end of the day, rather arbitrary. Under liberal theory, violent revolution is justified when an executive conflicts with the will of the people and the people have the right to establish a government of their choosing and in the case of Pakistan, theoretically speaking, it could be an Islamic state. Thus, liberalism could justify the creation of an Islamic state through a violent revolution. Islamic law itself prohibits such an action. To me, this shows the vitality and coherency of Islamic law as opposed to Western liberalism.
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Published November 7, 2007 . Filed under: Islamic Revolution

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is revolution in pakistan imminent?
September 24, 2008 @ 8:35 am
I would say its heading towards state fragmentation.
September 25, 2008 @ 12:05 pm